Abstract -Preliminary risk analysis (PRA) is a methodology used in critical systems safety studies. It is primarily used at the preliminary stage of the system's design so as to determine the scenarios of potential accidents, to evaluate their probabilities of occurrence (frequency) as well as the severity of the resulting consequences and to propose solutions (preventive and/or mitigative safeguards) in order to reduce the risk level in terms of severity/occurrence (to reduce the frequency of the contributors or reduce the severity of the accident). The preliminary risk analysis was largely used in several industrial fields (aeronautics, weapons systems, chemistry, railway...) in order to study the safety of the systems. From one field to another, from one expert to another, many extremely different approaches and methods are used to carry out this analysis. Moreover, the formats representing the results of the PRA are often varied as well as the terminology and the concepts related to the PRA. The main goal of this paper, completed within the framework of project ANR-PREDIT-SECUGUIDE 1 , is to propose a PRA method and to determine standard contents of PRA to be used in the context of the railway systems.
Current railway standards [1] , [2] and [3] were regularly revised to take into account the permanent technological projections in the electronic materials fields and in the data-processing techniques. Those have an important impact on the railway systems design. However the standards did not formalize yet well the process of distribution of the safety regulations of the railway system on its subsystems, hardware and software which supports them. In other words, if the risks are well identified and followed through demonstrations and safety justifications, it remains to improve the Risks Analysis and Safety Requirements Allocation steps. Authors of [7] have examined the methods for risk analysis and assessment of safety activities and proposed optimized one method for risk estimation.
The objective of this work is to propose a method and standard contents for a PRA in the context of railway signalling and command and control systems. This method will integrate the impact of the NICT on safety in terms of risks induced on the whole system. The evolution of the systems design passes by the integration of the NICT. The NICT are considered as Components Off The Shelf (COTS). The COTS allow controlling the cost of system realization, but on the other hand there is a loss of safety control [6] . Thus the proposed method will have to take into account the inherent risks in this type of component. Another constraint relates to the taking into account of the human errors. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the columns definitions of the PRA and a PRA method is proposed in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the description of the phases of PRA method presented previously. Finally, concluding remarks and perspectives are given in the last section.
II. COLUMNS DEFINITIONS OF PRELIMINARY RISK ANALYSIS
Knowing that the results of the Preliminary Risk Analysis are presented in a worksheet and the various definitions of the terms and concepts related to the PRA, we dedicate this section to detail these concepts. Basing on CENELEC standards [1] , [2] , [3] and [4] we propose definitions of the columns of PRA applied to the railway control systems. A standardization of the principal concepts and associated terminology is indeed proved to be necessary, after study of several railways PRA of various sources (manufacturers, owners...), where -Damage (or consequence): it is result of an accident given in terms of death, physical wound, injuries, attack to people health or environment damage.
-Severity level: a classification on several levels, it allows to evaluate and estimate the consequences of potential accidents. According to [1] , Table I describes typical hazard severity levels and the consequences associated with each severity level for railway systems. In order to avoid bad interpretations of the qualitative terms, some manufacturers and/or owners use numbers to describe severity levels (from 1 to 4 in order of increasing severity, 4 = catastrophic).
-Frequency of Occurrence: probability of the sequences of events. As in [1] , qualitative evaluation of probability or frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event and a description of each category is proposed in Table II .
-Measurements (safety measures, safety constraints or safety requirements): suitable actions to reduce or eliminate risk. They can be preventive measures which allows reducing the probabilities of occurrences of the dangerous events or protection measures by using safety devices allowing reducing the severity of damage. This column could describe the subsystem (equipment, system…) charged to ensure the safety measures -Event causing a potential accident: it is a dangerous event that transforms a dangerous situation into a potential accident. It does not exist in the case of scenarios of order 1. Columns could appear in the PRA, for the sequences of dangerous events which allow passing from a dangerous situation to an accident, this depends on the studied scenario order.
-Potential accident: a potential accident could be an accident or quasi accident. The effective occurrence of damages (e.g. collision) determines the accidental identity of the potential accident else it is an incident (e.g. crossing over a restrictive signal without effective collision).
III. PROPOSED METHOD
The objective of Preliminary Risk Analysis method is [5] : -To determine the dangers (hazards) and their causes (dangerous entities, dangerous situations and potential accidents). -To evaluate the severity of the consequences of situations and accidents previously determined. -To deduce the measurement and the suitable actions to eliminate or reduce dangerous situations and the potential accidents. Fig. 1 summarizes these steps. The identification of dangerous entities, dangerous situations and the potential accidents rests at the beginning on the experiment and the judgment of the specialists, helped by guide lists which are updated by the experience feedback throughout the lifecycle of the system. Likely to occur sometime in the system life cycle. The hazard can reasonably expected to occur Improbable Unlikely to occur but possible. It can be assumed that the hazard may exceptionally occur. Incredible Extremely unlikely to occur. It can be assumed that the hazard may not occur.
Fig. 1. Steps of Preliminary Risk Analysis
The PRA is generally considered as an inductive approach (proceed from causes to identify consequences), however some actors consider it as a deductive approach. A deductive or inductive analysis does not relate to the general method described by Fig. 1 but only to the first step (1): identification of dangerous entities, dangerous situations and potential accidents. During this step, some experts determine the set of potential accidents (consequences) by induction on the basis of the dangerous entities (causes); other experts proceed by deduction to identify the dangerous entities or the dangerous events (causes) from the potential accidents (consequences). When we dispose of a complete list of all potential accidents (respectively dangerous entities / feared events) the deductive approach (respectively inductive approach) alone is valid and lead to acceptable results covering all possible scenarios. On the other hand for systems having a significant number of scenarios and if we don't dispose of complete lists of potential accidents (respectively dangerous entities / feared events), using only deductive approach (respectively inductive approach) is not efficient. In these cases, it is possible that the used approach does not take into account the potential accidents (respectively dangerous entities / feared events) not included in the generic list. To avoid this problem, a deductive-inductive approach should be used. 
IV. PROCEDURE FOR PROPOSED PRA METHOD
In this paragraph we will present the various phases of PRA method presented in the previous paragraph.
At the beginning of cycle 1, the lists of feared events, dangers and potential accidents are initialized at ER 0 , D 0 and A 0 Phase 1 (Fig. 3 ) allows determining the dangers starting from the feared events (inductive phase). Note that the analysis could also be performed from the potential accidents to the feared events (opposite direction of the cycle). This by reversing the order of the phases in the following way: the cycle starts with phases 4 and 3, phase 5, then the phase 1 and finished by phase 2. 
